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ABSTRACT
Based on a survey of civil servants in the Norwegian central
government, this article describes perceptions of coordination
capacity and examines to what degree the variations in perceived
coordinating capacity can be explained by structural and cultural
features. In particular, it focuses on the significance of wicked
policy areas. Overall the coordination capacity is weaker in wicked
policy areas than in other policy areas. Controlling for other fea-
tures the coordination capacity is primarily related to cultural
factors, such as mutual trust, level of conflict, and identification
with the central government. Some structural features, such as









Governments across the world are struggling to deal with ‘wicked policy problems’,
such as climate change, immigration, and crime (Head, 2018). The question of how to
address ‘wicked problems’ has been around since Rittel and Webber (1973) published
their seminal article and the debate on this issue has now moved beyond the different
dimensions that they defined 40 years ago. Brian Head (2018) argues for closer links
between the wicked problems literature and policy studies, while the focus in this article
is on structural and institutional types of theories. Accordingly, it is natural to focus on
the New Public Management (NPM) reform wave, with its emphasis on structural
vertical and horizontal specialization, resulting in fragmented government apparatuses,
thus aggravating the wicked issues problems and the related post-NPM reforms trying
to cope with this fragmentation (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017).
Wicked problems pose highly complex and ambiguous policy planning and devel-
opment challenges and also raise implementation and service-delivery problems that
cannot be solved within a single sector or administrative level. By definition, a wicked
problem has no optimal solution, but more or better collaboration and coordination
between different actors, organizations and levels are often seen as a key precondition
for governments to address complex governance challenges and hence as a way forward
(Head & Alford, 2015; Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015). In addition, they are often highly
contested and debated policy areas, characterized by disagreements on the definition of
problems and solutions and multiple actor negotiation processes, which may result in
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more or less ambiguous compromises (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Olsen, 1983;
Wilson, 1989). This alludes not only to structural design problems, but to institutional
or cultural aspects of legitimacy.
This article investigates coordination capacity in the Norwegian central government
apparatus with a special focus on the areas of climate change, immigration, and the
police. We examine what characterizes government coordination capacity within these
policy areas and how one can explain them. The dependent variable is therefore civil
servants’ perceptions of coordination capacity in their own field of work. The article
underscores the relevance of structural features for coordination capacity as well as
governance legitimacy by examining the effect of identity, levels of conflict and trust
relations on coordination arrangements. So the core argument is that the dynamic
relationship between structural and institutional factors determine the coordination
capacity, which adds cultural factors to the equation. Following from this, we expect
that structural and institutional contextual features at country- and sector-level affect
coordination practices and explains variations in perceived coordination capacity.
The article contributes predominantly to the conceptual and policy domain literature
on wicked problems. It aims at reducing a research gap in the literature by focusing on
coordination as one core dimension of wicked problems. It has both a descriptive aim
at mapping the perceived coordination capacity and explanatory ambition by examin-
ing the variation in coordination capacity from a structural and a cultural-institutional
perspective.
The main research questions posed are:
● How do civil servants perceive the overall coordination capacity?
● Are perceived coordination capacity different in the wicked policy areas of climate
change, immigration and policy compared to other policy areas?
● To what degree can structural and cultural features explain the variation in
perceptions of overall coordinating capacity?
Our data are taken from a survey of civil servants in the Norwegian ministries and
central agencies conducted in 2016.
We will start by clarifying our core concepts and our theoretical approach. Second,
we will give an outline of the Norwegian context. Third, we will describe our methods
and data sources. Fourth, we will present our empirical findings. Fifth, we will discuss
the findings in relation to the theoretically derived expectations. Finally, we will sum up
the main findings and draw some conclusions.
Conceptual clarification, theoretical perspectives and variables
Coordination and coordination capacity
The literature of coordination and integration in public administration and public
policies is growing and different concepts and terms have been used. One can distinguish
between governance centered approaches focusing on policy processes and implementa-
tion, and government-centered approaches focusing on coordination and the institutional
and organizational dimensions (Tosun & Lang, 2017; Trein, Meyer, & Magetti, 2018).
This article leans more toward the second approach. Coordination can be defined as the
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purposeful alignment of units, roles, tasks and efforts in order to achieve a predefined
goal (Bouckaert, Peters, & Verhoest, 2010). Coordination is about adjusting the actions
and decisions of interdependent actors to achieve specified goals (Koop & Lodge, 2014).
Thus, we regard coordination both as a process and as an output.
Administrative coordination capacity is basically aboutmediating and bringing different
administrative units and dispersed actors to work together in order to achieve joint actions
(Governance Report, 2014). It is about aligning organizations from different backgrounds
under often tricky conditions (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014). It applies to the competencies of
‘boundary spanning’ capacities and the ability to bring different expertises together
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2011; Hood & Lodge, 2006). Thus, it is not only about vertical
coordination by hierarchy but also about facilitating horizontal coordination across policy
areas and organizations at the same administrative level. Attempts to improve the coordi-
nation capacity is a recurring theme in contemporary administrative reforms (Lægreid,
Sarapuu, Rykkja, & Randma-Liiv, 2016;Wegrich & Stimac, 2014).
Choosing between different means of coordination entails prioritization, but each
means carries different risks, such as increasing complexity and hybridity. Wicked
problems involve a risk of ‘coordination underlap’ (Koop & Lodge, 2014) – i.e. when
a particular policy issue falls between the boundaries of different government organiza-
tions it can become a responsibility of none. Or it might involve ‘coordination overlap’,
when a policy issue is of relevance to several different organizations and all of them
want to be involved in policy making. The three selected policy areas represent different
mixtures of ‘overlap’ and ‘underlap’ (Wegrich & Stimac, 2014).
Coordination is often considered as a workable solution to wicked problems and
a potent remedy for a lack of capacity and legitimacy in the public sector (Head &
Alford, 2015; Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015; Lægreid, Sarapuu, Rykkja, & Randma-Liiv,
2014). Such problems intensify the need for contingent coordination, collaborative
governance and network approaches (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Kettl, 2003). Climate
change, crime and immigration are typical examples of wicked issues. These issues
demand interconnected administrative responses.
Explanatory perspectives – structural and cultural features
We apply both a structural-instrumental perspective and a cultural-institutional per-
spective to understand the variations in perceived coordination capacity. According to
the structural-instrumental perspective, decision-making processes in public organiza-
tions are either the result of strong hierarchical steering or of negotiations among top
political and administrative leaders (March & Olsen, 1983). The formal structure of
public organizations will channel and influence the models of thought and the actual
decision-making behavior of civil servants (Egeberg, 2012; Simon, 1957).
Luther Gulick (1937) stressed the dynamic relationship between specialization and coor-
dination: the more specialization there is in a public organization, the greater the pressure for
increased coordination or vice versa. The challenges of ‘coordination by organization’, his
main type, are also qualitatively different depending on whether the structural specialization
is based on purpose, process, clientele or geography (Egeberg, 2012).
This perspective offers insights into variations in how coordination is experienced in
different policy areas and among officials performing different tasks, in different
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positions, and at different administrative levels and in different coordination arrange-
ments. The argument is that these diverse formal features affect how internally or
externally directed their work is, how technical or non-technical their tasks are, the
number and type of stakeholders they have contact with, etc.
The cultural-institutional perspective views the development of a public organization
as based on historical traditions, path-dependency and informal norms and values
(Krasner, 1988; Selznick, 1957). Actors will think and act according to a logic of appro-
priateness, not primarily one of consequence (March, 1994). Coordination in a cultural
sense might mean developing a common culture, so that civil servants and their leaders
share informal norms and values, which may, in turn, facilitate actual coordination
(March & Olsen, 1989). This way of thinking is reflected in the concept of ‘value-based
management’ (Halligan, 2007). NPM meant increased structural fragmentation, but also
cultural fragmentation, and a challenge for leaders under the post-NPM reforms has been
to bring public organizations culturally back together again (Gregory, 2003).
There is a dynamic relationship between the structural and cultural factors concern-
ing coordination (Christensen & Lægreid, 2008). The ideal, seen from a leadership
point of view, is that coordination is improved by reinforcing the effects of structure
and culture (Christensen & Peters, 1999), meaning that the leaders, either hierarchically
or through negotiations, are able to use cultural norms and values as an ‘institutional
glue’. But, the effects of structure and culture could also be loosely coupled or pointing
in different directions, like when professional cultures in civil service are undermining
the political and administrative leadership and their goals and actions (Peters, 2015).
Independent variables and expectations based on the perspectives
Based on the structural-instrumental perspective, five different explanatory variables are
applied. First, we distinguish between policy areas according to their degree of wicked-
ness. We address the fields of climate, immigration and the police as examples of
wicked policy areas in contrast with other policy areas. Levin, Cashore, and Bernstein
(2012) see climate change as a ‘super wicked’ problem. There is no strong central
authority coordinating efforts to combat climate change. Climate change policies are
characterized by conflicting objectives and means-end thinking in adaptation and
mitigation, not to mention the effects of structural and policy instruments. The issue
transcends structural and functional boundaries and administrative and organizational
levels and policy areas, creating a crucial need for coordination across levels and sectors
and between actors (Jagers & Stripple, 2003; Rykkja, Neby, & Hope, 2014). Some
researchers highlight the network characteristics of the climate policy field, where
policymakers, stakeholders, regulatory bodies, civil society and academic communities
interact in an unusually complex manner (Sygna, O’Brien, & Wolf, 2013).
The issue of immigration is also extremely politically salient, reflecting global shifts
in conflict patterns and in economic and political conditions as well as in the
attention of the media and various stakeholders (Gievers & Lueddtke, 2005). It is
cross-sectoral, with links to welfare policy, foreign policy, healthcare, education,
housing policy, security and more, and involves public authorities at the local,
national and international levels. The tension between societal considerations and
individual cases is important and involves decision-making on different levels and in
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different policy areas that balances discretion related to rules and laws. This policy
area is also very sensitive to crises and sudden events threatening international
regimes and challenging domestic coordination, as experienced with the 2015 refugee
crisis in Europe (Myrberg, 2018).
Police disregards sector challenges, and police work demands involvement and
collaboration of many different sectors and policy areas: the immigration and
integration authorities, the military, the customs authorities, local emergency units,
the court system, the correctional services, the justice authorities, child protection
authorities, health and welfare authorities as well as civil society organizations.
A core challenge for coordinating the police is how to balance partly conflicting
values such as purposefulness, resilience, fairness and efficiency, combining cultural
and structural measures.
The three policy areas face both internal and external coordination challenges. All
three policy areas involve key coordination challenges – horizontally, among minis-
tries or central agencies, and vertically, between ministries and central agencies,
central and local government, and national bodies and supranational bodies as well
as with civil society.
But there are also significant variations between the three different policy areas
regarding the degree and scope of wickedness, which might lead to problems when
putting them into one category. There might be variations related to complexity,
uncertainty and ambiguity, and also to the regulative, normative and cognitive features
of the policy fields (Scott, 2013). Climate change is by some considered an ultimate
wicked problem field (Pollitt, 2016).
More specifically, the wicked policy fields include civil servants in the Ministry of
Climate and Environment, the immigration, integration and police departments in the
Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Norwegian Environmental Agency, the
Directorate of Integration and Diversity, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration
and the Police Agency. One expectation is that civil servants in these ministries and
agencies will perceive coordination capacity as worse than civil servants in other parts
of the central government, owing to the constraints imposed by the principle of
ministerial responsibility. We expect horizontal coordination and coordination across
administrative levels to be especially problematic, based on problems with capacity,
span of control and excess slack (Cyert & March, 1963; Gulick, 1937).
Another contrasting expectation is that these ministries and central agencies have
been assigned coordination responsibilities that straddle policy areas and administrative
levels, and additional resources, which works in practice and gives them better coordi-
nation capacity than the regular line ministries and agencies. These features could be
furthered by policy saliency and attention (Wilson, 1989). A third possibility is that the
principle of ministerial responsibility and the cross-boundary coordination assignments
will counteract one another in practice and result in no significant variation between
the different policy areas.
Second, we distinguish between administrative levels. Here the expectation is that the
coordination capacity will be perceived as more positive in ministries than in central
agencies. This is due to the strength of the principle of ministerial responsibility and
available resources for coordination by hierarchy, which will favor ministries
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(Christensen & Lægreid, 2008). Especially we expect that this will be the case when it
comes to coordination capacity within own policy field.
Third, we examine the effects of tasks. The expectation is that civil servants who have
coordination as their main task or who work with tasks and matters that require
collaboration across administrative levels and ministerial areas will face more coordina-
tion problems than other civil servants, especially when it comes to transboundary
coordination. This may reflect capacity problems and problems of control (Gulick, 1937).
Fourth, we expect participating in network arrangements to make a difference.
Inter-organizational groups, forums and boards are coordination arrangements that
are supposed to enhance coordination capacity and the expectation is that civil
servants participating in such units will report better coordination capacity than
other civil servants.
Finally, we expect variations according to position in the hierarchy. Leaders have
more responsibility for organizing and furthering coordination and they are therefore
likely to see coordination differently to executive officers lower down in the hierarchy
(Egeberg, 2012). This leads to a general expectation that leaders will score highest in
their positive evaluation of a broad range of coordination forms but also have
a relatively high score on particularly demanding types of coordination.
According to the cultural perspective, we use three different sets of cultural variables
to explain variety in civil servants’ experience of coordination. First, a central precondi-
tion for working together in the civil service is mutual trust, so in this case we aim to
find out whether civil servants think the level of mutual trust between the ministry and
subordinate agencies is high or not. Our expectation is that a high level of mutual trust
will enhance coordination capacity (Rhodes 1996). The second variable is whether the
civil servants’ tasks and areas of responsibility are characterized by a high or low level of
conflict (Wilson, 1989). The expectation here is that a high level of conflict will make
coordination more difficult and challenging. The third variable is identity (Selznick,
1957). The expectation here is that civil servants scoring high on identification with the
public administration as a whole will perceive higher coordination capacity than those
who mainly identify with their own department or ministry.
Context
Norway is a unitary state with a decentralized political and administrative system. It has
a large public sector and the level of mutual trust between central actors and public-sector
organizations is generally high. Compared to many other countries the coordination
capacity is high in Norway, both regarding coordination quality and coordination out-
come (Governance Report, 2014). This is especially the case when it comes to internal
vertical coordination within own policy area, while horizontal coordination across policy
area and also across administrative levels are more challenging (Christensen & Lægreid,
2019; Lægreid et al., 2016).
Two governance doctrines are central. First, the principle of ministerial responsibility,
which tends to enhance vertical coordination within policy areas, but constrains
horizontal coordination between them. It is very effective when the problem structure
follows the organizational structure, but not so when it comes to wicked problems.
Thus, problems of pillarization, departmentalization, tunnel vision, and silo attention
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will be core challenges for handling wicked issues in the areas of climate, immigration
and police (cf. Pollitt, 2003). Some ministries, such as the Ministry of Climate and
Environment, which is broadly responsible for environmental questions and the
Ministry of Justice and Public Security, which in 2016 had responsibility both for the
police and for immigration and integration issues, have some coordination tasks across
ministerial areas, but they struggle to fulfill their role as overarching ministries.
The second governance doctrine is local self-government. While this may enhance
coordination within each local municipality, it risks producing multilevel coordination
challenges between local and central government. There are elected bodies at both local
and regional level and these are expected to make their own local policy without too
much interference from central government. At the same time, they are, like regional/
local branches of central agencies, also supposed to implement policies coming from
central government.
In recent decades, two development features in the Norwegian central government
have affected the coordination pattern. First, the ‘NPM era’ involved vertical specia-
lization and the creation of more semi-independent agencies, but also increased
horizontal specialization, leading to structural and cultural fragmentation (Pollitt &
Bouckaert, 2017). Performance management was introduced, which mainly
addressed vertical coordination within each ministerial area and did not have
much to offer to enhance horizontal transboundary coordination. The result was
often a mismatch between organizational structures and problem structures, which is
typical for wicked problems.
Second, Norway’s integration in the European Union through the Economic Area
Agreement has increased the need for horizontal coordination and for a unified
Norwegian position to be formulated on various policy issues. To facilitate this, 18
special overarching committees have been established covering both ministries and
agencies and different policy sectors. The members of these committees are civil
servants in the affected ministries and agencies.
The wicked area of climate change involves several policy areas with potentially
conflicting goals, e.g. environmental and energy policy, transportation, infrastructure,
agriculture, health, etc. This is evident in the Norwegian Climate Agreement, which
received broad political support across established political dividing lines. In Norway,
the coordination of immigration control and integration policy is a main challenge,
which to a great extent has been allocated to different authorities and administrative
levels (Christensen & Lægreid, 2009). The Norwegian police have been criticized for
inadequate coordination between administrative levels, regional subdivisions and with
other sectors, as shown during and after the terrorist crisis in 2011 (Christensen,
Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2015). The ongoing Norwegian police reform focuses on structural
arrangements through merging and centralization. However, decentralization might be
necessary to enhance community policing, to maintain the civil character of the police
and proximity to citizens.
In the climate field in Norway, the administrative bodies are not concentrated in the
Ministry for Climate and Environment and the Environment Agency but fragmented
and spread out across a wide range of quite diverse ministries and agencies (Neby &
Zannakis, 2018). It is also a rather new policy area and more science-driven. In contrast,
the police is a more mature, settled and old policy field and more administrative
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concentrated and with stronger administrative culture. The field of immigration is
characterized by a lot of reorganization (Christensen & Lægreid, 2009) and was also
in the middle of an immigration crisis when the survey was conducted.
This context illustrates the special challenges that civil servants in Norwegian
ministries and central agencies face when handling and assessing coordination issues.
In the Norwegian case, a number of changes in government have made coordination
more difficult and there is an increasing demand for both horizontal and multilevel
coordination.
Methods
The empirical data in this article are based on a survey of Norwegian civil servants
conducted in 2016. At the ministry level the total population of all civil servants in all
ministries with at least 1 year tenure, from executive officers to top civil servants, were
asked. In central agencies, a sample of every third civil servant with the same tenure,
randomly selected, was included.1 A total of 2322 employees in the ministries and 1931
in the central agencies answered the survey. The response rate was 60% in the ministries
and 59% in the central agencies, which is overall in international comparison is a very
high response rate.
The dependent variable
By coordination capacity, we mean the administrative capacity within the civil servants
fields of work when it comes to get actors to collaborate and to cooperate (Lodge &
Wegrich, 2014). It includes formal structural and procedural features of the administrative
apparatus aiming at bringing together disparate organizations to engage in joint action.
Thus, our dependent variable regarding coordination capacity is based on the
following questions:
How do you assess the administrative capacity of the public administration within your field
of work regarding getting actors to collaborate and cooperate?
The respondents were asked to choose between five options ranging from ‘very good’ to
‘very poor” plus a ‘don’t know’ category.
The independent variables
The structural variables include administrative level, policy area, position, network
arrangements, and coordination and collaboration tasks.2 Regarding administrative
level, we distinguish dichotomously between ministries (= 2) and central agencies
(= 1). Position varies on a five-point scale from low, meaning executive officers
and advisors, to middle managers and top civil servants. Policy field denotes the
transboundary wicked areas of immigration, climate change and the police as
opposed to other policy areas which includes the rest of policy areas covered by
1The codebook is available from Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD): http://www.nsd.uib.no/ polsys/ forvaltning/
sentraladm2016.html.
2For a specification of the independent variables, please see Appendix.
244 T. CHRISTENSEN ET AL.
Norwegian central government. Network arrangements is an additive index of
participation in external working and project groups, horizontal across policy
area, and vertical both upwards to the international level and downwards to the
local and regional level as well as participation in public commissions during the
last year. The coordination tasks variable concerns whether coordination is a main
task or not. Transboundary collaboration is operationalized on a scale where
higher values indicate that civil servants work in areas or on issues that demand
less collaboration across administrative levels and/or policy areas.
The cultural variables include the level of conflict, mutual trust relations and
identification with central government. The level of conflict is operationalized with
a five-point scale where civil servants assess their own field of work as characterized
by a high or low degree of agreement (higher values imply more conflict). Mutual
trust is based on a question where civil servants were asked to rate the level of
mutual trust between the ministry and agency on a scale from very good to very
poor. Identification is operationalized with a scale where civil servants rate their own
affiliation and identification with the central government administration in general
as strong or weak (higher values indicate lower identification).
We apply an ‘ordinary least squares’ (OLS) regression model to analyze the
survey responses. Since the dependent variable has values on ordinal scale from 1
(very good) to 5 (very bad) we have performed an additional ordered logistic
(OLOGIT) regression analyses to test the robustness of our OLS results. The
different estimators essentially produce the same results. The same independent
variables are significant, with coefficients pointing in the same direction, in the
two analyses, except for main tasks and a transboundary collaboration which is
significant at .05 level in the OLOGIT regression but slightly below .05 in the OLS
regression. We have also checked for multicollinearity by gauging the variation
inflation factor (VIF) values, which are all within an acceptable range (i.e. below
2). For ease of interpretation, we present the coefficients from the OLS regression in
the article. The OLOGIT-results and VIF-values are included in the appendix.
Main results
Level of coordination capacity
Overall, perceptions of coordination capacity are rather mixed (Table 1). Only 54%
report that it is good or very good in their own policy area. Table 1 also reveals, first,
that overall coordination capacity is perceived as poorer in the selected wicked areas
taken together than in other policy areas.
Second, Table 1 also shows that there are clear variations among the three
selected policy areas that encompass the wicked issues category. Overall, coordina-
tion capacity is perceived as better in the climate area than in the areas of
immigration and police, and about on the same level as for all the other policy
areas. Assessments of coordination capacity are lower for the police than for
immigration.
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Variation in coordination capacity. multivariate analysis
Going back to the overall explanatory power of the independent variables, the most
striking finding is the importance of cultural features (Table 2). When controlling for
structural features; conflict, trust relations and identification show a systematic and
strong correlation with perceived coordination capacity. A high level of mutual trust,
a low level of conflict and a high level of identification with central government all seem
to enhance positive perceptions of coordination capacity. The strongest factor is the
level of conflicts on own policy area.
Table 1. Perceived coordination capacity by policy area. Individual responses by civil servants in




Immigration Other policy areas Total
Very good 9 6 6 7 11 10
Good 43 21 34 36 45 44
Neither good nor bad 39 52 43 42 34 35
Bad 8 19 14 12 9 9
Very bad 2 2 3 2 2 2
N = 100% 147 63 133 393 3018 3411
We have treated ‘don’t know’ as ‘missing’ and performed list-wise deletion before calculating the descriptive statistics.
Table 2. Ordinary least squares regression analysis considering the standardized





























* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Regarding the structural features, there is no overall significant effect of policy area
on coordination quality.3 Administrative level has, however, a significant effect on
coordination capacity. Civil servants in the ministries perceive coordination capacity
to be stronger.
The OLOGIT also shows that the having coordination as a main task and working
with transboundary collaboration seems to have an effect on collaboration capacity
(Table A2). This effect is, however, less significant than administrative level and
conflicts, trust and identification. Overall, the coordination culture might be as impor-
tant as the structural features to understand the variation in coordination capacity
(Wegrich & Stimac, 2014).
Hierarchical position seems to have no overall effect, which is somewhat surprising
since this is generally a powerful independent variable in many analyses of these types
of data (Christensen & Lægreid, 2008). Another interesting observation is that network
arrangements do not seem to have any effect on coordination capacity.
Discussion
A main finding of the descriptive analysis is that civil servants in the wicked policy areas
report lower levels of perceived coordination capacity. Another finding is that there are
clear variations among the three wicked policy areas concerning perceptions, with climate
change area as deviant among the three areas and more similar to the other policy areas.
Why are the descriptive analysis indicating that the civil servants in the three wicked
policy areas scoring overall lower on perceived coordination capacity than the civil
servants other policy areas? One answer to that could be that these policy areas are
characterized by a more complex pattern of institutions and actors than the others, and
that they, therefore, are struggling more to coordinate. It could also be part of the
equation that means-end thinking or rational calculation is more demanding in these
policy areas (cf. Dahl & Lindblom, 1953). One reason for the policy area climate change
scoring relatively higher than police and immigration might be linked to climate issue
as being the ultimate and ‘super wicked’ problem (Levin et al., 2012; Pollitt, 2016).4
Moving to the multivariate analyses, the significance of policy area disappear. Overall
our main results are mostly supporting the notion that the negative effects of ministerial
responsibility and strong sectors on coordination, on the one hand, and positive
experiences in the practice of belonging to wicked issue areas, on the other, counteract
each other. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not find support for the expected negative
effect of wicked policy areas on coordination capacity. Neither do we find any support
for the contrasting expectation that these ministries and central agencies have been
assigned coordination responsibilities that straddle policy areas and administrative
levels, and additional resources, which works in practice and gives them better coordi-
nation capacity than the regular line ministries and agencies. Thus a main finding is
that whether a policy area is labeled a wicked problem or not has overall a limited effect
on perceived coordination among civil servants.
3We also did a regression analysis of the climate, police and the immigration fields separately without finding any
significant effects of each policy area.
4Another explanation could be political priorities to give more resources to the policy area of climate change, also
because Norway is an important gas and oil nation.
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However, one may also discuss methodological factors involved, i.e. it has not been
differentiated strongly enough between and inside policy areas according to the degree
of wickedness. There are certainly variations between the police, climate change and
immigration in this respect and there may be variation within specific areas too. For
example, the Ministry of Climate and Environment and the Climate Agency have
a rather broad range of tasks that include not only climate issues, but also environ-
mental protection, pollution, contamination and nature management. Similarly, the
other policy areas might include other wicked issues such as poverty, unemployment or
public health. In practice, wicked features can be seen as part of a complex continuum
of problem types (Alford & Head, 2017). Therefore, our categorization of wicked policy
areas might be too rough and include too much ‘noise’.
We expected civil servants in the ministries to face more coordination capacity than
those working in the central agencies. The findings support this expectation. Civil
servants working in ministries report better coordination capacity. This might reflect
that ministries have more authority, resources and instruments for coping with coordi-
nation problems than the agencies (Christensen & Lægreid, 2008). Political and admin-
istrative leaders in the ministries have diverse potential coordinative measures, like
committees of under-secretaries of state, staff supportive functions for coordination,
organized ‘duplication’ units, meaning units systematically working on control and
coordination of issues and agencies, etc. (Egeberg, 2012). There are major structural
reasons for expecting more interaction inside public organizations than across organi-
zations boundaries horizontally and vertically (Simon 1957). Organizational units and
actors that are close to each other will perceive interaction and coordination differently
compared to those that have to cross structural borders to communicate and coordinate
(Egeberg, 2012).
Also, tasks matter. The expectation of a positive relationship between having coordi-
nation as a main task and coordination capacity gets some support. Transboundary
collaboration taps another and more practical aspect of coordination, i.e. whether actors
work in areas that demand collaboration across levels and sectors. We expected civil
servants working on transboundary issues to face more coordination problems than other
civil servants. Yet, our findings suggest the opposite. Civil servants with transboundary
tasks report stronger coordination capacity. So we might have some of the same effects
here that we found for administrative level, i.e. a lot of exposure to coordination
challenges does not primarily lead to coordination problems but to positive coordination
capacity. In other words, there might be a ‘learning by doing effect’ concerning coordina-
tion (March, 1994).
Network arrangements do not enhance coordination capacity in any significant way.
This indicates that such network arrangements do not significantly improve coordination
capacity. One interpretation of this might be that such arrangements are more about
information-sharing than about coordination. There might be more negative than positive
coordination if the participants’main task is to defend their own parent institution (Radke,
Hustedt, & Klinnert, 2016; Scharpf, 1999). Since this is a rather wide and heterogeneous
additive index, it might also be methodologically too diverse to have an effect.
Going back to our theoretical perspectives and expectations, we find support for the
cultural-institutional expectations. It is clear that the cultural-institutional perspective
has the strongest explanatory power, relative to the structural perspective. These
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findings confirm other studies on coordination quality (Christensen, Danielsen,
Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2016; Christensen & Lægreid, 2008; Lægreid et al., 2016). Civil
servants who report a high level of mutual trust between ministries and central
agencies, who work on non-salient issues with a low level of conflict and who strongly
identify with the central government apparatus as a whole are more satisfied with both
coordination capacity and within own policy area, across policy areas, upwards to
international bodies and downward to regional and local government. The effect of
conflicts and disagreement on own policy area relations is especially strong. Thus,
cultural features seem to have a positive effect on perceived coordination capacity.
So, what general conclusions can we draw from these observations? One is the
insight derived from Krasner (1988) on institutionalization. He differentiates between
vertical depth and horizontal width in understanding what produces overall cultural
integration or cohesion in public organizations (Selznick, 1957). Vertical depth denotes
the extent to which actors are influenced by the main informal cultural norms and
values in their actions, while horizontal width denotes the extent to which actors see the
cultural norms and values of other units as important for their own. The three variables
in question have elements from these two dimensions. Identification per se indicates
strong cultural commitment, and the broader it is, the more an actor cares about other
units and sees his/her work in a collective or holistic perspective. Mutual trust definitely
relates to horizontal width and integration. If there are formal structural barriers to
coordination, mutual trust can facilitate coordination in practice. The same goes for
lack of conflict. The lower the level of conflict, the easier it is to overcome structural
boundaries and vested interests and to interact and coordinate. So the structural and
cultural factors seems to be reinforced concerning explaining perceptions of coordina-
tion capacity (cf. Christensen & Peters, 1999).
Conclusion
Going back to the broader picture, this article reveals, first, that there are coordination
challenges within the Norwegian central government apparatus. Only about half of the civil
servants report that coordination capacity is good or very good. Second, the variations in
perceived coordination capacity are due more to cultural features than to structural
features. What matters most for coordination capacity is strong mutual trust relations,
a low level of perceived conflict and strong identification with the central government in
general. This indicates the importance of cultural integration in structurally fragmented
systems, i.e. cultural factors that counteract the effects of structural barriers for commu-
nication and interaction across organizational borders (Krasner, 1988; Selznick, 1957).
Third, there are effects related to three structural variables: administrative level,
coordination tasks and transboundary tasks. Civil servants working in ministries and
who has coordination as a main task report better coordination than other civil servants
do, which is supporting our expectations. This leads us to conclude that the challenges
of coordination may foster competence and positive experiences rather than problems.
Working on issues that require transboundary collaboration does not seem to have
a negative effect on coordination capacity; while formally having coordination tasks has
some effect. This might indicate the same mechanism as for administrative level,
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namely, that exposure to the challenges of coordination may foster positive effects on
coordination capacity.
The policy implications of this analysis are first that there is a need to problema-
tize wickedness. One way of doing it is to reconceptualize wickedness by including
different degrees of structuredness (Turnbull & Hoppe, 2018). Second, the ‘wicked
policy’ fields are characterized by differences and not only by similarities and that we
need to take the specific features of different ‘wicked policy’ fields into consideration
when addressing them. Third, even if better coordination is widely seen as necessary
to respond effectively to wicked problems, the political and managerial challenges of
effective coordination of such problems can be significant. There is no magic bullet
for design for wicked problems (Peters, 2015, 2018). Fourth, rather than applying
overly optimistic or pessimistic strategies for handling ’wicked’ problems, having
a pragmatic approach (McConnell, 2018), aiming at piecemeal and incremental
reforms allowing for adaptation and experimental learning might be a fruitful way
forward. Rather than having unrealistic high expectations regarding how to deal with
‘wicked issues’, a small wins framework (Termeer & Dewulf, 2018) might be a more
promising response.
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
Coordination capacity 3,411 2.488 .871 1 5
Independent variables (structural features)
Administrative level 4,285 1.458 .498 1 2
Position 3,180 3.657 1.377 1 5
Policy area 4,285 .112 .316 0 1
Network arrangements 3,174 2.586 2.279 0 14
Coordination tasks 3,966 1.848 .358 1 2
Transboundary collaboration 3,741 2.384 1.237 1 6
Independent variables (cultural features)
Conflict 2,858 2.509 .899 1 5
Mutual trust 2,854 2.347 1.400 1 6
Identification central government 2,750 2.533 .960 1 5

























* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The displayed results are not transformed to odds-ratios. Standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table A3. Variation inflation factors.
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Administrative level 1.37 .728
Position 1.22 .817
Policy area 1.20 .835
Network arrangements 1.17 .857
Coordination tasks 1.08 .925
Transboundary collaboration 1.08 .929
Conflict 1.07 .930
Mutual trust 1.04 .959
Identification central government 1.04 .964
Mean VIF 1.14
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